

10. SIGNED AGREEMENTS

EXCHANGE OF NOTES¹

Bohlen Collection

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

MY DEAR MARSHAL STALIN: I have been thinking, as I must, of possible political difficulties which I might encounter in the United States in connection with the number of votes which the Big Powers will enjoy in the Assembly of the World Organization. We have agreed, and I shall certainly carry out that agreement, to support at the forthcoming United Nations Conference the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics as members of the Assembly of the World Organization. I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure whole hearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.

I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you would perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference. I would greatly appreciate your letting me have your views in reply to this letter.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

¹ A summary of the agreement embodied in this exchange of notes was released to the press by the White House on March 29, 1945 (Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1945, vol. XII, p. 530). The texts of the notes here printed are from the copies in the Bohlen Collection. For information concerning the decision by the United States to request no more than one vote in the United Nations Assembly, see *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, p. 422, and Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1945, vol. XII, pp. 600-601.

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President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill

TOP SECRET

[YALTA,] February 10, 1945.

DEAR WINSTON: As I said the other day, I am somewhat concerned over the political difficulties I am apt to encounter in the United

States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three great powers will have only a single vote in the Assembly. I understand from our conversation that you would have no objection if I found it necessary to work out some way of giving the United States additional votes in order to insure parity. I am writing you this letter since I know you understand so well our political situation in the United States and I hope in reply to this letter you can give me your agreement to this suggestion if I find it necessary for our public opinion to make some proposal along those lines at the forthcoming United Nations Conference.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have written to Marshal Stalin on the same subject.

Most sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt

[YALTA,] February 11, 1945.

MY DEAR FRANKLIN, I have given consideration to your letter of February 10 about the political difficulties which might arise in the United States in connection with the ratification by the Senate of the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement because of the fact that the United States alone among the three Great Powers will have only one vote in the Assembly.

Our position is that we maintained the long-established representation of the British Empire and Commonwealth; that the Soviet Government are represented by its chief member, and the two republics of the Ukraine and White Russia; and that the United States should propose the form in which their undisputed equality with every other Member State should be expressed.

I need hardly assure you that I should do everything possible to assist you in this matter.

Yours very sincerely,

WINSTON CHURCHILL

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Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

Translation¹

KOREIS, February 11, 1945.

DEAR MR. ROOSEVELT: I have received your letter of February 10. I entirely agree with you that, since the number of votes for the

¹ Appears on the source text.

Soviet Union is increased to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the assembly, the number of votes for the USA should also be increased.

I think that the number of votes for the USA might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two basic Republics. If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.

With sincere respects

I. STALIN

TRILATERAL DOCUMENTS

740.0011 EW/2-1145

*Communiqué Issued at the End of the Conference*¹

REPORT OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, and Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have met with the Foreign Secretaries, Chiefs of Staff and other advisors in the Crimea.

In addition to the three Heads of Government, the following took part in the Conference:

For the United States of America:

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State
 Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. N., Chief of Staff to the President;
 Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President;
 Justice James F. Byrnes, Director, Office of War Mobilization;
 General of the Army George C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff, U. S. Army;
 Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet;
 Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces;
 Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator
 Major General L. S. Kuter, U. S. A., Staff of Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces;
 W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the U. S. S. R.
 H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department;
 Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State;
 Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, together with political, military and technical advisors.

¹ Released to the press Monday, February 12, 1945. The text here printed is from the original signed document in the files of the Department.

For the Soviet Union:

V. M. Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Admiral Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy
 Army General Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army
 A. Ya. Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 I. M. Maisky, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Marshal of Aviation Khydyakov
 F. T. Gousev, Ambassador in Great Britain
 A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador in U. S. A.

For the United Kingdom:

Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
 Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport
 Sir A. Clark Kerr, H. M. Ambassador at Moscow
 Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
 Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet
 Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff
 Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff
 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord
 General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense,
 together with
 Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theatre
 Field Marshal Wilson, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington
 Admiral Somerville, Joint Staff Mission at Washington
 together with military and diplomatic advisors.

The following statement is made by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the President of the United States of America, and the Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the results of the Crimean Conference:

I

THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the Conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allies than ever before. The fullest

information has been inter-changed. The timing, scope and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the East, West, North and South have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this Conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

II

THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed. These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the Three Powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central Control Commission consisting of the Supreme Commanders of the Three Powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the Three Powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi party, Nazi laws, organizations and institutions, remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people;

and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazism and Militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

III

REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A Commission for the Compensation of Damage will be established. The Commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied Countries. The Commission will work in Moscow.

IV

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a Conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25th, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the Conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

V

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the

three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to creat[e] democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

VI

POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

VII

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the Agreement² between them should be put into effect immediately, and that a new Government should be formed on the basis of that Agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new Government has been formed, it should declare that:³

- (i) The Anti-fascist Assembly of National Liberation (Avnoj) should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament (Skupschina) who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament; and
- (ii) legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly.⁴

There was also a general review of other Balkan question[s].

VIII

MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the Conference, besides the daily meetings of the Heads of Governments and the Foreign Secretaries, separate meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries, and their advisers have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore,

² For the text of this agreement, see *ante*, pp. 251-254.

³ The portion reading "it should declare that:" is handwritten on the original and initialed in the margin by Bohlen.

⁴ The words "Anti-Fascist Assembly of" are handwritten on the original, as is also "(AUNOJ)", the latter replacing the word "Committee" as typed. These changes are initialed in the margin, as in the case mentioned in the previous footnote.

meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every three or four months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three Capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on world organization.

IX

UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our Governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with continuing³ and growing co-operation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want".

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
И. СТАЛИН⁴

FEBRUARY 11, 1945

⁵ I. Stalin.

L/T Files

*Protocol of Proceedings*¹

PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions.

I. WORLD ORGANISATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organisation should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

¹ Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947.

(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945 and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey). When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i. e. the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of the Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organisation.

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of _____ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organisation, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of _____ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments".

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations,² and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

II. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

"The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

² The final s of "consultations" was added with pen and ink. The change is not initialed in the margin.

"When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

III. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL³ FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council³ for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:⁴

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received

³ The word "Council" is a substitution with pen and ink for "Commission" as typed. In the margin opposite the change is a small panned question mark. The change is not initialed.

⁴ The original bears the notation in handwriting at this point: "Title to be added as in protocol." The title was not added, but the following was inserted in handwriting: "The Heads of the three Governments have agreed as follows:" The change is not initialed in the margin.

in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is⁵ to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

⁵ The word "is" is handwritten, replacing "are" as typed. The change is not initialed in the margin.

VII. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference:

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland.⁶ The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorised as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U. S. S. R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U. S. A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement⁷ should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

⁶ The phrase "of the Western part of Poland" read "of Western Poland" as typed, but was revised by hand on the original, with no initials in the margin.

⁷ For the text of this agreement, see *ante*, pp. 251-254.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and⁸

(ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;⁹

and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER
ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER¹⁰

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with M. Molotov in Moscow. M. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

XI. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

- (a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
- (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
- (c) Oil equipment in Roumania.

⁸ As typed, this sub-paragraph began "that the National Liberation Committee". The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin.

⁹ As typed, this sub-paragraph began "that legislative acts passed by the National Liberation Committee". The changes were made in handwriting, with the initials of Bohlen in the margin.

¹⁰ No paper on the Italian-Austrian frontier has been found. Examination of the minutes of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers on February 10 (*ante*, p. 876), of the British proposals attached thereto (*ante*, p. 887), and of the British note of February 11 (*ante*, p. 965) suggests that the heading "Italo-Austria Frontier" should read "Austro-Yugoslav Frontier".

XII. IRAN.¹¹

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran.¹¹ It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments.¹² The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimean Conference, February 11, 1945.

E R STETTINIUS, JR

B. МОЛЮТОВ.¹³

ANTHONY EDEN

¹¹ Changed by hand from "Persia" as typed in the original. No initials in the margin.

¹² In the original as typed the phrase at the end of this sentence read "to the three Governments." The change was made by hand, with no initials in the margin.

¹³ V. Molotov.

L/T Files

*Protocol on German Reparation*¹

PROTOCOL ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN REPARATION IN KIND

The Heads of the three governments agreed as follows:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparation are² to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

¹ Released to the press by the Department of State March 24, 1947.

² Cf. ante, pp. 978-979.

2. Reparation in kind are³ to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives—one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the total sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FRANKLIN D ROOSEVELT
И. СТАЛИН⁴

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

³ Cf. ante, pp. 978-979.

⁴ I. Stalin.

L/T Files

*Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War
Against Japan*¹

TOP SECRET

AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The *status quo* in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

И. СТАЛИН²FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

FEBRUARY 11, 1945.

¹ Released to the press by the Department of State on February 11, 1946; printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 498; also in 59 Stat. 1823.

² I. Stalin.

BILATERAL DOCUMENT

L/T Files

*Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union Concerning
Liberated Prisoners of War and Civilians*¹

AGREEMENT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY FORCES OPERATING UNDER SOVIET COMMAND AND FORCES OPERATING UNDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COMMAND

The Government of the United States of America on the one hand and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other hand, wishing to make arrangements for the care and repatriation of United States citizens freed by forces operating under Soviet command and for Soviet citizens freed by forces operating under United States command, have agreed as follows:—

Article 1.

All Soviet citizens liberated by the forces operating under United States command and all United States citizens liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.

United States and Soviet military authorities will respectively take the necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.

Article 2.

The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens of the other contracting party found by them, and will at the same time take the necessary steps to implement the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and United States repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.

Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from

¹ Released to the press by the Department of State March 8, 1946; printed as Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 505; also in 59 Stat. 1874.

the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.

The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be effected by agreement with the competent Soviet or United States authorities. The removal of camps and transfer of liberated citizens may, in exceptional circumstances, also be effected without preliminary agreement provided the competent authorities are immediately notified of such removal or transfer with a statement of the reasons. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.

Article 3.

The competent United States and Soviet authorities will supply liberated citizens with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall, subject to the provisions of Article 8, be fixed on a basis for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers. The basis fixed for civilians shall as far as possible be the same as that fixed for privates.

The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens of the other contracting party.

Article 4.

Each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use in agreement with the other party its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens held by the other contracting party.

Article 5.

Soviet and United States military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and United States authorities shall agree upon beforehand.

Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.

In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and United States Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens necessary settlements with the Governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.

Article 6.

Ex-prisoners of war and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and United States authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers.

Article 7.

The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or United States authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.

Article 8.

The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.

Article 9.

This Agreement shall come into force on signature.

Done at the Crimea in duplicate and in the English and Russian languages, both being equally authentic, this eleventh day of February, 1945.

For the Government of the United States of America

JOHN R DEANE
Major General, U. S. A.

For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ГЕНЕРАЛ-ЛЕЙТЕНАНТ ГРЫЗЛОВ *

*Lieutenant General Gryzlov.

11. POST-CONFERENCE DOCUMENTS

Editorial Note

In the course of compiling the present volume a few hitherto unpublished documents were found in which important participants at the Yalta Conference made authoritative statements on the proceedings, or portions of the proceedings, at the conference itself. Since these statements supplement the contemporary conference record, they have been reproduced at this point.

For previously published statements by participants regarding the proceedings at Yalta, the reader may wish to consult the following:

Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, March 1, 1945, Department of State *Bulletin*, March 4, 1945, volume XII, pages 321-326, 361; *Congressional Record*, 79th Congress, 1st session, volume 91, pages 1618-1622.

Report by Prime Minister Churchill to the House of Commons, February 27, 1945, *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th series, volume 408, columns 1267-1295.

Press conference of President Roosevelt, April 5, 1945, *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman, 1944-45 volume, pages 610-611.

Statement by Secretary of State Stettinius, Department of State *Bulletin*, April 8, 1945, volume XII, pages 600-601.

Testimony of Alger Hiss, *Communist Espionage in the United States Government*, Hearings before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 2d session, pages 656-657.

Testimony of George C. Marshall, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 1, pages 559-565.

Statement of W. Averell Harriman, *Military Situation in the Far East*, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 82d Congress, 1st session, part 5, pages 3328-3342.

Testimony of Charles E. Bohlen, *Nomination of Charles E. Bohlen To Be United States Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 83d Congress, 1st session, *passim*.

860C.01/3-645 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

[Excerpts]

SECRET
PRIORITY

Moscow, March 6, 1945—2 a. m.

636. We had three more unproductive hours of discussion at the meeting of the commission on Poland this evening, going over much the same ground as last time.

Every argument Clark Kerr and I advanced was brushed aside. For example I told him that I knew the President would be shocked to learn of Molotov's obstruction to the progress of the work of the commission in objecting to our calling representative Polish democratic leaders to Moscow. I pointed out that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the inviting of Sapieha and Witos to Yalta¹ and I failed to understand why Molotov now went back on this position. In reply he said that the communique was the "anchor" for the commission's work and that no other conversations at Yalta had a bearing.

¹ See *ante*, p. 711.

Roosevelt Papers

The Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion (Byrnes), to the President

[Excerpt]

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James F. Byrnes

At Yalta, the Prime Minister wished to discuss shipping and the British Import Program. Hopkins and I advised Lord Leathers that the problem was too complicated to be discussed so far away from basic data and that it would have to be resolved in Washington. Leathers accepted this viewpoint and said on several occasions that he would come to the United States at an early date to discuss the shipping situation.

Hiss Collection

*The Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1945.

1. Attached is a draft message from the President to Marshal Stalin along the lines you indicated to Mr. Raynor over the telephone Saturday. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky strongly recommend that the President should not at this time send a message to Stalin on this subject for the reason that there are three or four other urgent matters of great importance which will require messages of this nature. (One of these has already been sent.) Mr. Dunn feels that it will rob this method of communication of its true importance when so many messages are sent at once. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky feel that you should take this matter up yourself with Ambassador Gromyko along the lines of the attached outline of points to be made.

2. Mr. Dunn and Mr. Pasvolsky also feel strongly that we should not attempt, at least at this time, to get out of the commitment on this subject which was made at the Crimea. They therefore think that any message from the President that might be sent despite their recommendation should not go into that subject and should be limited simply to the precise issue raised by Gromyko last Saturday.²

[Attachment 1]

SECRET

DRAFT MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MARSHAL STALIN

Last Saturday Ambassador Gromyko informed the State Department that a party of thirty representatives of the Ukraine and White Russian Soviet Republics would arrive at San Francisco to attend the Conference. I feel certain that there must be some misunderstanding about this communication. During the Crimean Conference it was very clearly settled that these two republics would not be invited to send representatives to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there. It was agreed that the United States and the United Kingdom would support at San Francisco a Soviet proposal, to be presented at the Conference when the question of initial membership is under discussion there, that the two republics be included among the initial members of the United Nations Organization when

¹ Carbon copy.² It appears that the proposed telegram from Roosevelt to Stalin was not sent but that a note was sent by Stettinius to Gromyko on March 29, 1945, indicating that at Yalta "no obligation whatsoever was assumed in regard to the question of the presence of representatives of these republics at San Francisco" (500.CC/3-2545). See also *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, p. 396, footnote 11.

created. I want you to know that since my return to Washington I have been giving this matter very considerable thought. I have in particular been considering how the objectives you have in mind could be carried out most effectively. Quite frankly the difficulties, both in relation to the effect on American public support for the proposed organization and to the attitude of other governments, seem to be far greater than I had realized. I expect to communicate further with you on that aspect of the matter later but in the meantime I should appreciate it if you would take steps to clear up the misunderstanding which has led to Ambassador Gromyko's communication of Saturday.

[Attachment 2]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS TO BE MADE BY THE SECRETARY IN TALKING TO AMBASSADOR GROMYKO

1. I am very much disturbed about the statement made to Mr. Dunn last Saturday.
2. It was clearly settled at the Crimean Conference that the two republics would not be invited to San Francisco and would not be separately represented there.
3. In accordance with this decision no invitations have been issued to them.
4. It would be most embarrassing and contrary to the Crimean arrangements if their representatives should come to San Francisco.
5. Ambassador Gromyko should take this up with his Government immediately and have any misunderstanding eliminated.

[Attachment 3]

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS REACHED AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF THE TWO SOVIET REPUBLICS³

The Soviet Representatives proposed that two or three of the Soviet Republics should be invited to the San Francisco Conference and should become initial members of the organization.⁴

This matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers for consideration. At the Foreign Ministers' meeting Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden jointly agreed that in the course of the San Francisco Conference the Soviet Representatives would propose that the Ukraine and White Russian Republics be named as initial members of the organization and that this proposal would be supported by the British Representatives.

³ Although this memorandum is not referred to as an attachment in the covering memorandum, it appears to have been prepared as an accompaniment to the memorandum of March 19. The author was presumably Hiss.⁴ *Ante*, p. 712.

Mr. Stettinius said that he would have to reserve his position.⁵ This meeting was held at the British Delegation's headquarters with Mr. Eden presiding. A drafting committee composed of Mr. Jebb, Ambassador Gromyko and Mr. Hiss was appointed to draft the report of this meeting, to be read at the next plenary session by Mr. Eden as Chairman of that day's meeting of the Foreign Ministers. The draft agreed upon by the drafting committee was in the foregoing sense. Subsequently, without clearing with or informing Mr. Hiss or, presumably, Ambassador Gromyko, the British Representatives changed the report⁶ so that it stated that representatives of both the United Kingdom and the United States will support the proposal to admit the Soviet Republics to original membership. The British Representatives said that they had cleared this change with Mr. Stettinius but this was not the case as he did not understand that any such issue was presented to him. At the afternoon plenary session⁷ Mr. Eden read the revised report and before the matter could be clarified the President expressed his agreement as a matter of policy.

The question of whether or not the two Soviet Republics should adhere to the United Nations Declaration prior to April 25 and the question of whether they should be invited to the Conference were both discussed fully at the plenary session and a negative decision was reached on each point.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 737.

⁶ It appears from Stettinius, pp. 196-197, that between the adjournment of the drafting committee and the convening of the Fifth Plenary Meeting the President had had a private talk with members of the British Delegation and had agreed to this change.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 772, 775.

Roosevelt Papers : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the President*¹

[Excerpts]

TOP SECRET

Moscow, April 2, 1945.

(Personal and Top Secret for the President from Harriman)

Aside from the major questions which are causing concern in our relations with the Soviet Union there has been an accumulation of minor incidents which started some six weeks ago. The following are only examples: . . . Little or no progress has been made in getting Soviet approval for our air teams to visit Soviet controlled territory for appraisal of bomb damage or for our naval team to [visit] Gdynia. Both proposals were agreed to at Yalta.

¹ Sent by the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels.

Roosevelt Papers

*Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt*¹

Translation²

[Moscow,] April 7, 1945.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

In connection with your message of April 1³ I consider it necessary to make the following remarks on the question of Poland.

Matters on the Polish question have really reached a dead end.

Where are the reasons for it? The reasons for it are that the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow—members of the Moscow Commission—have departed from the principles of the Crimea Conference and have introduced into the matter new elements not provided by the Crimea Conference.

Namely: a) At the Crimea Conference all three of us considered the Provisional Government of Poland as the government functioning in Poland at the present time which is subject to reconstruction and which should serve as kernel of the new government of national unity. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow depart from this principle. . . .

b) At the Crimea Conference all three of us agreed that not more than five persons from Poland and three persons from London should be called for consultation. But the Ambassadors of the United States and England in Moscow have departed from this position and demand that each member of the Moscow Commission be given the right to invite an unlimited number of people from Poland and from London.

Naturally, the Soviet Government could not agree with this as the summons of people should be carried out according to decisions of the Crimea Conference, not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, namely by the Commission as such. But the request of an unlimited number of persons summoned for consultation contradicts the plans of the Crimea Conference.

c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the fact that in accordance with the meaning of the decisions of the Crimea Conference such Polish leaders should be invited for consultations who, firstly, recognize the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the decision on the Curzon Line, and, secondly, are really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

¹ Transmitted by the Soviet Embassy, Washington.

² Appears on the original.

³ Not printed.

Hiss Collection

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Hiss)*¹

SECRET

EXCERPTS FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF PLENARY SESSION OF
FEBRUARY 6, 1945

Dictated at San Francisco, June 3, 1945 on the basis of longhand notes made during the meeting of February 6, held at Livadia Palace, Yalta.

President Roosevelt asked Mr. Stettinius to explain the United States' proposal on the voting formula as Mr. Stettinius was at Dumbarton Oaks and none of the three heads of delegation was. The President said that he felt strongly that people are going to insist on getting something that will insure peace, not for all time, but say for fifty years.

Mr. Stettinius then read "Statement on the American Position on Voting in the Council"² and concluded by making further remarks based upon the memorandum entitled "Supplementary Arguments for Use of Secretary"³. He concluded by expressing the hope that America's two great allies would be able to agree with the American proposal.

The President then suggested that Mr. Stettinius read the types of decisions which would require unanimity of the permanent members under the American proposal. The President's suggestion was agreed to and Mr. Stettinius then read the bottom half of page 1 and all of pages 2 and 3 of the memorandum entitled "Formula for Voting Procedure in the Security Council of the United Nations Organization and the Analysis of the Effects of that Formula."⁴ (He did not read again the actual proposed voting formula which is set forth in the first half of page 1 in the memorandum under reference. Before he read from this Mr. Stettinius distributed copies of it to the British and Soviet Delegations.)

In reading from this memorandum Mr. Stettinius specifically distinguished between the two categories of questions. In reading the first group of topics he said, "I shall first present six situations in which the unanimity of the great powers must be maintained at all times". Before reading the second list of items he said, "I shall now

¹ The copy is unsigned, but the author was presumably Hiss.

² *Ante*, pp. 682-683.

³ *Ante*, pp. 683-684.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 684-686.

read the situation[s] which also require the affirmative votes of seven members of the Security Council including the votes of all the permanent members, except that a member of the Council would not cast its vote in any such decisions that concern disputes to which it is a party, in other words unanimity except when involved in a dispute".

The President then stated that that ended the reading and the explanation of the procedure involved in the American proposal. He said then that we have to remember that the objectives of the five great nations and of all nations is the same and that on the question of procedure there ought not to be any real difficulty.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion brought about by Stalin's question as to in what respect the voting formula as read by Mr. Stettinius differed from the texts submitted by the President in his telegrams of December 5.⁵

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 58-60.

606.00/6-345: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State (Grew)

RESTRICTED

SAN FRANCISCO, June 3, 1945.

[Received June 3—7 p. m.]

5. Please transmit the following to the President as from me:

"Referring to our telephone conversation yesterday on the veto aspects of the voting procedure, the precise issue at present, as to which there has been a great deal of confusion especially in the press, is whether the veto power applies on the part of a great power not involved in a dispute so as to enable that great power to prevent having a situation discussed in the Council where such discussion is merely for the purpose of enabling the Council to decide what [if] any action it should take or recommend. We are all in agreement that the unanimity of those great powers not involved in a dispute should apply to substantive decisions which the Council is called upon to make. The question of whether such a great power can prevent a situation from even being placed on the agenda and discussed in a preliminary way prior to the taking of substantive decisions was not covered either at Dumbarton Oaks or at Yalta. However, the British and we have always assumed and we have so stated publicly that any determination as to whether or not the Council itself undertake any such preliminary discussion should if a vote is required at all, be decided by not more than a procedural vote, i. e. without any of the great powers as such being able to exercise a veto. We are still hopeful that we will be able to reach agreement with the Soviet delegation on the interpretation of this question which is of course one on which we feel we cannot retreat.

You may be interested to know that in the course of the statement on voting procedure which I made to the February 6 Plenary Session at Yalta, I emphasized the importance which we ascribe to full and

free discussion. That conference addressed itself only to the issue of a great power abstaining from voting in a dispute. However, my statement was in such broad terms that, especially when taken in conjunction with later interpretative public statements issued by the Department on the precise issue now under consideration, there can be no possible basis for any contention that our present position could be considered to be in violation of the Yalta agreements. According to the best records available to us here the exact language of the two paragraphs in my Yalta statement which referred to freedom of discussion was as follows:¹

"Our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the council is permitted, the establishment of the world organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the organization, even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated."²

¹ See *ante*, pp. 661-662.

² Notation on file copy reads: "Message sent to the White House 6/4/45 8:30 a. m."

INDEX