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GSLL 254H
Spring
Semester 2021
Professor David Pike dpike@email.unc.edu The
Occupation of Germany. The Origins of the first (1945-1949), the Beginnings of a new Cold War
(2000-2016), a New Era (2016 - )
Though scholars have long disagreed about the earliest causes of the Cold War, and will surely continue to do so, no one disputes that the “German question” played a central role in the break-up of the wartime alliance and the political division of western and eastern Europe that lasted for almost half a century. Ironically, in the case of Germany, its postwar division into four separate zones of occupation, a harbinger of division, was not the result of disagreements among the allies over the question of how to treat a defeated Germany. The original “division” developed rather out of the wartime consensus that splitting the country into occupied zones was the best way of ensuring that Germany never again waged war. In effect, the original protocol on zones of occupation agreed upon by the British, American, and Soviet governments prior to the war’s end pointed toward the harshest possible treatment of Germany ever contemplated by the allies. Breaking the country into a number of separate states, with the idea that the split would be permanent, was thought by many to provide the best guarantee of security against future German aggression. But the allies never agreed upon a policy of permanent dismemberment. What the allies ultimately did approve, however, the system of zones, was not something inherently different than dismemberment. Once the two main zones congealed into semi-permanence, the one occupied by the Russians, the other “jointly” by the Americans, British, and French, and by the time these two zones turned into the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, to all intents and purposes “dismemberment” was the result — for forty years. Then, in the immediate aftermath of dramatic changes in the late eighties in the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the USSR, it all changed, as they say, in the twinkling of an eye. “Germany,” too, dissolved itself – but only one part of Germany, of course, which was merged into the other and became not a new country, but a much larger Federal Republic of Germany. But who had been chiefly “responsible” for what we in the West considered the disgraceful “sundering” of a country into two hostile parts, the most dramatic manifestation of which was the Berlin Wall? Was this division of Germany inevitable, and if so, why? If not, how did it happen? Was the Cold War inevitable? If yes, why? If not, why not?
These are the questions this class will explore in several chronological contexts, with decades separating the frameworks and with differing levels of emphasis in class on each ostensibly self-contained "historical" cycle: – 1917-1933, 1933-1939, 1941-1945, 1945-1949, 1949-1989, 1989-2000, 2000-2016, and 2016 moving forward. There is no way to discuss these time periods, and the interconnectedness, linearly, moving strictly from past to present. Connections can only be made by moving back and forth between the periods, looking for commonalities, intersections, temporary (?) ruptures, remergences of conflict, and - a big question - missed opportunities (?). Opportunities to do what? Avoid the precise situation(s) we find ourselves in today. And/or, to pose repeatedly the "mother of all questions" - was the Cold War inevitable? Asking that question is the same as asking whether the division of Germany into two states, one democratic, the other not, was inevitable or avoidable. And in either way we answer the question, to ask: why? Or Why not?
Having worked out the range of questions necessary to ask about the end of allied cooperation during the war and the immediate postwar period, the emergence of conflict and controversy, and the creation of permanent “cold war,” we will look at just what it is the minute examination of quite “new” and voluminous Soviet archival documents tell us about these events. In this context, we will augment the course with a concrete example of the lengths scholars must often go if they wish to find reliable answers to elusive questions, integrating into it my ongoing project, funded by the German Volkswagen Foundation, to microfilm, digitize, and index some two million pages of archival documents in the Russian State Archive pertaining to the Soviet occupation of Germany and to make them available online in a state-of-the art digital archive and enterprise-level database. We will integrate this advanced research tool into the course, using it less to explore the specific content of documents (they are all in Russian) than to examine cutting-edge techniques and tools for asking questions and looking for answers. We will examine the design of the digital archive and its database with an eye to appreciating how technology can enable scholars to come to terms with the raw material of history, in this case, reams of documents. We will also use this tool to explore the nature of questions that the “written” record – published or not – cannot answer. Against this backdrop, having put ourselves in a position to ask probing questions about patterns of Soviet conduct in the early cold war then, we can transition to the present – the daily impressions of unfolding events involving Russia today, right up to and including Russian intervention in Georgia and the Russian public rationale for the invasion. We can then undertake, looking back at our course “foundation,” to place aspects of early cold war issues in the context of emerging Russian conduct now. We will talk about the nature of this behavior in relation to patterns of western outlooks and actions then and now (are “our” actions in the West needlessly provocative to the Russians?); looking at how historians are assessing and reassessing Soviet policy to this day; considering interpretations of Russia’s path in the twenty-first century; and pondering the possibility of a new, perhaps inevitable conflict with her.
This course will therefore allow us to ask a range of questions about the prospects for democracy in a country as important as Russia, looking both at the original promise of perestroika and glasnost after decades of single-party rule, but also considering now the recent curtailments there on democratic developments. Students will be engaged in discussions of these contemporary issues “under Putin” and now Medvedev even as we look closely at the “case study” of occupied Germany and its “democratization,” at least in one half of it, in order to consider, as regards the other half, the nature of ongoing historical debates as to whether Stalin could have regarded the postwar establishment of democracy in “our” or in “his” Germany as anything other than a lethal threat, whether defined ideologically or in some other terms. Some historians regard the division of Germany, as well as the cold war, as having been inevitable due to the nature of Stalin and the system he created; others, even now, argue that deals with Stalin could have been struck that would have avoided the cold war. We will discuss these questions “topically,” in addition to their historical context, by inquiring into the current state and direction of Russian democracy. This approach, for all the differences between the Stalinist years and the “Putin era,” offers us a prime opportunity to study a “historical period” over a half-century old, while placing key questions about it in the context of later events unfolding on a daily basis now – and with the outcome uncertain. After all, it does seems as if the question of Russia and her relations with Europe and the United States comes down to the potential for the establishment of the shared values necessary for more stable international partnerships. If there was no potential in the years 1945 to 1949, say, then the division of Germany and the start of the cold war was probably unavoidable, or so many historians would argue. However, others are suggesting that these shared values need not have made any difference and that “partnership” with Stalin was achievable in spite of the “internal” nature of his regime. A similar debate is ongoing today regarding Russia and “the west.” To what extent does Russia now and in the future need to be or become a “democratic” country for us to develop and enjoy stable relations with her? Is Russia even capable of democracy and does she want it? After all, even without a ubiquitous secret police, Putin enjoys an immense popularity.
Grading
Procedures and Course Policies
This course is heavily lecture- and discussion-oriented. Readings, discussions, and written assignments are all in English; course requirements are straightforward — attendance is mandatory,* class participation, the course's general lecture approach notwithstanding, nonetheless always heavily valued, and keeping current with reading assignments a necessity. Expectations revolve less, however, around some kind of overall student absorption of wide-ranging lectures and, perhaps, discussions, which due to the nature of the subject will often tend to shift back and forth in time between “beginnings” and “ends” (to the extent that we are at an end in 2018 (we are likely well into a new "beginning"). rather, students will write two substantive papers, one due around mid-term time of 7-8 pages in length, the other, 12-15 pages, to be handed in by semester’s end. These papers will be based on "Germany and the Cold War" topics flexiblly understood and freely chosen by each student (with or without consultation with the instructor). *Course attendance policy: I follow generally university policy. There is no such thing as a, sort of, preexisting excused absence. If you have to miss class, you are required by me to send me, in advance, an email informing me of your absence and its reason. You are additionally required to keep your own written record of absences and reasons to hand in at the end of the semester. These are ways I hope make it unnecessary to take formal attendance, which is a waste of our time. Even when I am informed in advance of absences, barring very compelling circumstances, each absence during the semester beyond THREE results in a lowering of your grade by a half-point. Four absences lower your grade from A to A-, five absences lower it from A- to B+, and so on. As for grading, I consistently receive in my classes superb work, and I grade it accordingly. I have no set grade distribution "policy." Having said that, I cannot give every student and A, even in an environment nowadays where anything less is often considered by students to be, well, less than a success.
One final course policy, just in order to have this clearly stated in writing. No computers, no iphones, no iPads, etc. are allowed in class. Period. I do not want to see them, in your hand, on your desk, in your pocket. No kind of course "taping" (recording) is allowed under any other circumstances than if, for reasonable reasons, I am asked privately for permission in advance. Course Topic
Outline
First Semester “Quarter”: The Prelude (1918 – early 1945) German-Russian Relations Prior to Hitler: the twenties The War: From “Barbarossa” to Berlin by way of Stalingrad Planning the Occupation - Allied Discussions, Understandings and Agreements Second Semester “Quarter”: Initial Realities (spring 1945 – mid 1946) The First Year of the Occupation Presentation of Historical Archival Basis for “Occupation” Research – the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union / Russia Introduction to the digital archive of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (1945-1949) Occupation Planning versus Occupation Reality in Four Zones and in Berlin Third Semester “Quarter”: mid 1946 – Fall 1949) Occupation Necessities and the Emergence of Cold-War Conflicts Detailed presentation of “SVAG” Digital Archive – Historiographical Possibilities, Opportunities, and Difficulties Separation and division Fourth Semester “Quarter”: Contemporary Associations – The Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Aftermath (1986 to the present) The Beginning of the End – Gorbachev, Glasnost, and Perestroika The Yeltsin Years Putin The “New Cold War”?
List of Readings Our readings will (most likely all) be selected from the following books and articles - that is, in some cases, we will read texts in their entirety, but in most cases, I will have excerpted briefer sections from much longer texts (e.g., books) and placed them on our course websit in digitized form for your convenience. The historical (and other kinds of) literature on this subject is voluminous, to put it mildly, and because so much of it, particularly when more specialist aspects are involved, is not in English, it is very difficult to locate concise texts that cover the more precise issues I consider important. This is the main reason why this list may, at first glance, strike you as daunting, but reading expectations will be appropriate to this level of course. In addition, due to the nature of enormous changes in the nature of US-Russian relations, especially during the last few years, you will be receiving from me regularly links to important articles, commentaries, analyses related mostly to ongoing events, but at times as well, to relevant past historical events that, for one reason or the other, are being looked at and discussed now. The flow of these readings is utterly unpredictable, but often more important and topical and even relevant that the "official" readings for the class. These periodic readings are mandatory and will be covered in the final exam. Read them all, regularly, and ponder them, and the final exam will be no great challenge to any of you. The Atlantic Charter Lilia Shevtsova, Lost in Transition. The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies Edward Lukac, The New Cold War. Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West Lilia
Shevtsova, Putin's Russia |
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